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How to avoid compensating CEO for luck: the 









Incentive  effects  of  performance-based  compensation  schemes  for  management  may  be 
weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be 
seen as reflecting luck from the CEO’s perspective. In this chapter we present a model for 
how to avoid compensating CEO for luck by filtering out the macroeconomic influences. In 
the empirical section we analyze the impact of macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific 
factors on the compensations (salary, bonus, options, and pensions) of CEOs in 127 Swedish 
corporations during the period 2001-2007. We find macroeconomic influences on Swedish 
CEOs’ compensation  to be  substantial. Distinguishing between favorable and unfavorable 
macroeconomic developments, we find compensation to be more responsive to favorable than 
to unfavorable developments in macroeconomic variables. 
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How to avoid compensating CEO for luck: the 
case of macroeconomic fluctuations 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
Executive compensation is under scrutiny and there are calls for regulation and “codes of 
conduct” with  respect  to  levels  as  well as  forms  of  compensation. Although the level  of 
compensation in Europe remains below that in the US, the level in most European countries 
have  increased  rapidly  in  the  new  millenium.  According  to  Fernandes  et  al.  (2008)  the 
difference  between  Europe  and  the  US  can  be  explained  to  a  large  extent  by  the  larger 
variable component of executive compensation in the US. The higher variability in the US 
seems to be associated with a risk-premium. This observation implies that levels and forms of 
compensation are not independent.  
  One common view in the current debate is that CEO compensation should be linked to 
“sustainable” profits that presumably are the result of skill and effort. Regulation seems to be 
emerging in many countries stating that the reward for improved performance should not be 
fully  realized  unless  the  improved  performance  is  observed  for  a  period  of  3-5  years. 
Increased  compensation  would  be  linked  to  performance  surpassing  some  benchmark  for 
some duration. The argument behind such proposals would be that improved performance is 
likely to be caused by other factors than executive skill and effort if it does not exceed a 
benchmark for duration of time. The other factors could be earnings  management by the 
executives and some sort of luck.  
  There are a number of difficulties associated with proposals of the type discussed if 
they  are  to  provide  appropriate  incentives  for  managers.  The  concern  with  earnings 
management can be partly resolved by linking compensation to less manageable variables and 
by  improved  accounting  standards.  The  issue  of  luck  is  more  complicated  (Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan, 2001). One problem is to define a benchmark for performance representing a 
minimum level that would be achieved without particular skill and effort. A second problem 
is to determine when and how performance above (below) the benchmark should be rewarded 
(penalized) for being the result of skill and effort rather than luck. More fundamentally, what 
changes in performance are caused by luck or bad luck in an environment characterized by a 
variety of shocks? Even with the benefit of hindsight this question could be hard to answer.   5 
  The contracting literature indicates that optimal incentive contracts are achieved by 
means  of  some  kind  of  benchmarking  for  “normal”  performance  and  the  linking  of 
compensation  to  a  performance  measure  reflecting  skill  and  effort  with  as  little  noise  as 
possible.
1  
  Analyzing the impact of luck on CEO compensation Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2000, 2001) define luck as performance beyond CEO’s control. As examples, they consider 
performance effects of fluctuations in oil prices in the energy sector, the impact of exchange 
rates in traded goods sectors and changes in performance around year to year changes in mean 
industry performance. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) use a market index and an industry index 
as  proxies  for  stock  price  performance  based  on  luck.  In  all  cases  the  empirical  results 
indicate that compensation depends strongly on luck. Garvey and Milbourn also find that 
executives  are  rewarded  (penalized)  more  for  good  luck  than  for  bad  luck  and  that  this 
asymmetry can be linked to corporate governance variables. 
  Accepting the premise from the contracting literature that lucky performance should 
not  be  rewarded  there  is  an  additional  difficulty  associated  with  the  measurement  of 
performance outside the control of management. As pointed out by Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 
(2003) and Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2009) the effect on performance of external shocks 
beyond management’s control can be influenced by management’s strategic choices as well as 
operational decisions in response to external shocks. If so, the incentives of management to 
take advantage of lucky external events and to dampen the effects of unlucky external events 
would  be  removed  if  compensation  is  not  related  to  performance  effects  of  lucky 
circumstances.  
  The  implication  of  this  discussion  is  that  the  appropriate  definition  of  lucky 
performance depends on the nature of shocks and the technological ability to adjust strategy 
and  operations  to  shocks  within  a  certain  time  frame.  The  adjustment  of  strategy  and 
operations can take the form of investment in flexibility or real options in an environment 
characterized by high uncertainty about external shocks or adjustment may take the form of 
switching production and marketing efforts in response to anticipated and even current events. 
A restaurant business may be able to respond very quickly to lucky events by adding tables 
while a capital intensive firm may need years to adjust production capacity.  
  Lack of sustainability of performance is not a good indication of luck in all industries. 
Macroeconomic fluctuations may be short lived or last several years. The performance of a 
                                                 
1 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) reviews the contracting literature on incentive effects of compensation schemes.   6 
firm that can respond rapidly to macroeconomic fluctuations depends on skill and effort even 
in the short run. This calls for an approach that even in a shorter perspective can assess the 
sustainability of performance. 
  In this chapter we focus on the macroeconomic environment as a major source of 
changes in performance beyond management’s control. Macroeconomic fluctuations affect 
almost all aspects of corporate performance but they cannot be influenced by management. 
However, as noted, the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on corporate performance can 
be influenced by management if macroeconomic conditions can be forecast and operations 
can be adjusted within the period. For this reason we distinguish between anticipated and 
unanticipated  macroeconomic  conditions.  Depending  on  firm-specific  conditions, 
performance  beyond  management  control  may  be  explained  either  by  all  macroeconomic 
fluctuations or only by unanticipated fluctuations. 
  Our objective is to model the macroeconomic influence on CEO compensation and to 
estimate the macro economy’s contribution to changes in this compensation. The empirical 
analysis in this study is based on Swedish companies and the period under investigation is 
2001-2007. Most studies on CEO compensation are based on US firms and to some extent 
this choice is motivated by the easy access to detailed data for very long periods. However, 
our research question motivates the choice of a small open economy since a higher degree of 
openness  may  also  mean  higher  exposure  to  macroeconomic  factors  influencing  CEO 
compensation (Oxelheim and Randöy, 2005). Swedish firms are known to belong to the top-
five league regarding financial as well as commercial internationalization (UNCTAD, 2008).   
We  ask  how  compensation  for  Swedish  CEO’s  would  have  developed  had 
macroeconomic  influences  on  compensation  been  filtered  out.  Second,  we  distinguish 
between  anticipated  and  unanticipated  macroeconomic  fluctuations  to  see  how  CEO 
compensation had developed if only unanticipated macroeconomic influences were filtered 
out from compensation. Third, we ask whether there is an asymmetric impact on remuneration 
any  particular  year  in  the  sense  that  remuneration  is  particularly  sensitive  to  favorable 
developments in variables affecting performance. The interest in asymmetry arises because it 
may reflect “skimming” of shareholders in the words of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
and  because  asymmetry  affects  incentives  for  risk  management  with  respect  to  variables 
affecting compensation. 
 Compensation  is  typically  not  linked  in  a  simple  way  to  one  well-defined 
performance measure. Macroeconomic effects on compensation can occur through a number 
of channels depending on what aspects of performance affect salaries, bonus and other forms   7 
of  CEO  compensation.  Therefore,  we  focus  on  the  decomposition  of  compensation  into 
“intrinsic”  and  macroeconomic  components  rather  than  of  any  one  performance  measure. 
Presumably,  changes  in  compensation  net  of  changes  linked  to  macroeconomic  factors 
represent  compensation  for  changes  in  firms’  “intrinsic”  competitiveness.  We  control  for 
industry factors as well.  
  In Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003) the case of Electrolux was used in the context of 
value-based  management  (VBM)  to  illustrate  how  changes  in  performance  can  be 
decomposed into one “intrinsic” component and one component caused by macroeconomic 
developments. A set of domestic and foreign macroeconomic price variables (exchange rates, 
interest rates, price levels) were used to filter out the macroeconomic component from total 
changes in performance from quarter to quarter. One reason for using price variables is that 
they can be observed without a long lag. Therefore, they can be used in practice to decompose 
very recent changes in performance and, thereby, to adjust compensation.  
In the empirical part of this paper macroeconomic price variables are also used as 
indicators  of  macroeconomic  fluctuation.  The  period  2001-2007  is  determined  by  data 
availability. Industry factors are also included to the extent possible in the relatively small 
Swedish economy. After estimating the impact of macroeconomic factors we ask how salaries 
and bonus would have developed for the average firm during the estimation period had they 
been independent of total and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations, respectively.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the data set for compensation in the 
form  of  salary,  bonus,  option  awards  and  pension  payments  is  described.  Relevant 
performance variables explaining compensation are identified in Section 3. The contribution 
of macroeconomic factors to compensation and performance measures is estimated in Section 
4 using cross-section and panel analyses. In Section 5 we decompose compensation each year 
into  an  “intrinsic”  component  and  a  component  caused  by  macroeconomic  factors 
distinguishing between the total impact of the macro economy and the unanticipated impact. 
In  section  6  we  test  whether  remuneration  is  asymmetric  in  response  to  macroeconomic 
factors,  in  particular.  The  total  compensation  each  year  is  divided  into  symmetric  and 
asymmetric components. Concluding comments follow in Section 7. 
 
2.  The compensation data 
Our dataset covers compensation for CEOs and contains two samples: cash disbursements 
(salaries  and  bonus)  from  2001-2007,  and  total  compensations  (i.e.  salaries,  bonus,  stock 
option awards, and pensions) from 2004-2007. Data have been collected from annual reports   8 
for all Swedish firms listed on the stock exchange as Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap
2 
firms during the period 2001-2007. The firm-specific factors are collected from DataStream, 
while the macroeconomic factors are obtained from EcoWin (Reuters) database. 
Table 1 reports mean (in million SEK), standard deviation, as well as growth index 
(Index = 100 in 2001) for cash disbursement levels for the CEOs in 127 Swedish firms on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange during the period 2001 -2007.
3 We can see that in panel  C of 
Table 1, the compensation levels in the form of total cash disbursements increased during this 
period. On average, salary plus bonus increased 58  percent. A distinction is made between 
salary and bonus in panels A and B. The year 2001 is excluded here  because we could not 
separate the bonus from the salary for this year. Table 1 shows that bonus payments increased 
much faster than salary payments. Bonus payments increased 183 percent, while salaries 
increased only 30 percent. The former figure takes in to account both that average bonus 
payments increased and that the number of firms paying bonus increased. 
 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
 
In Table 2 compensation in the form of Option awards and contributions to Pensions 
are added. Since the option and pension da ta are only available from 2004, the descriptive 
statistics in this table refers to the period 2004-2007 (with index 100 in 2004). In Panel C we 
can see that compensation in the form of option awards  increases by 725 percent over the 
period. The variation  is substantial. Pension awards are stable and increase only 9  percent. 
Both options and pensions decreased in 2006. If we add all the components, i.e. Salary + 
Bonuses + Options + Pensions, we can see that the total increased 30  percent from 2004 to 
2007. 
 
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
 
3.   Explaining compensation without macroeconomic factors 
                                                 
2 It is grouped according to the market capitalization of the firm. Large-Cap > 1 billion Euro; 150 mil Euro < 
Mid-Cap < 1 billion Euro; Small-Cap < 150 million Euro. 
 
3 There is no publicly available database for executive compensation as in the US but the availability of data is 
limited to annual reports of firms specifying compensation to CEO. As of January 2005, the implementation of 
IFRS improved disclosure and access to detailed compensation data.   9 
Early US studies of executive compensation across firms focused on the relation between 
CEO  compensation  and  measures  of  firm  performance  (Coughlan  and  Schmidt,  1985; 
Murphy, 1985, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990), while other 
studies analyzed whether CEOs are rewarded for performance relative to a market or industry 
benchmark  (Antle  and  Smith,  1986;  Gibbons  and  Murphy,  1990;  Bebchuk  and  Grinstein 
2005). The US evidence indicates that benchmarking is not practiced much.  
  In  this  section  we  ask  which  measures  of  firm  performance  explain  CEO 
compensation across the Swedish sample of firms. The analysis in the following sections of 
the impact of macroeconomic factors is similar to analysis of benchmarking but it allows 
macroeconomic  factors  to  have  a  general  as  well  as  a  firm-specific  impact  on  CEO-
compensation. 
  Cash  compensation  (salary  plus  bonus)  is  used  as  the  main  measure  of  CEO 
compensation but we also analyze whether the results are likely to  generalize to a wider 
measure  of  compensation.  After  eliminating  the  missing  values  in  the  firm  performance 
sample, our final sample contains different numbers of firms in different years. Thus, the 
panel is unbalanced with a maximum of 127 firms and a minimum of 109 firms during the 
period 2001-2007. 
We begin by analyzing how the cross-section variation of cash compensation levels 
(salary plus bonus) for the CEOs depends on a number of firm-and industry performance 
measures, and we ask whether the cross section pattern is stable over the data period. The 
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The firm’s total sale is used as a proxy for firm size. Whether CEO compensation is 
more closely tied to firm size (sales) or firm profits is controversial due to a multicollinearity 
problem among the independent variables in the regressions (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Rosen, 
1992).  In  order  to  minimize  this  problem,  we  focus  on  variables  and  ratios  that  exhibit 
relatively little correlation with each other. A number of performance variables were tested in 
equation (1) to find which one(s) explains compensation the best. The variables were return 
on assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q. We found that Tobin’s Q (measured as market 
value relative to book value) had the most explanatory power. Therefore, Tobin’s Q is used as   10 
the performance proxy from now on. Seven industry dummies are used to control for industry 
factors.
4 
All the variables in the regressions in this study are in logarithms. Thus, the regression 
coefficients are interpreted as “compensation-performance elasticities.” One of the advantages 
of the elasticity approach is that it produces a better “fit” in terms of marginal effects. Another 
advantage  is  that  the  elasticity  is  relatively  invariant  to  firm  size  while  sensitivities  vary 
monotonically with firm size (larger firms having smaller betas) (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; 
Murphy 1999). 
Table 3 shows the results for equation (1) for each year and for pooled data. It can be 
seen that the elasticity with respect to sales remains fairly constant from year to year. The 
elasticity with respect to Tobin’s Q is also stable except for the relatively low elasticities for 
the years 2001 and 2002. 
The only industry showing a significant  difference from  the average  is  industry 4 
(health care). The compensation level in this industry has increased relatively fast. 
 
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
 
  Table 4 shows the results for the equation (1) for the pooled data by using different 
compensation measures as dependent variables: 1) Salary plus Bonus, 2) Salary plus Bonus 
plus Options, and 3) Salary plus Bonus plus Option plus Pensions. This sample covers the 
period 2004-2007. We want to check whether the coefficients for the firm-specific variables 
depend  on  the  scope  of  the  compensation  measure.  Table  4  shows  that  the  estimated 
coefficients remain very much the same when we add options and pension awards to salary 
plus bonus as the dependent variable. Since we have several more years of observations for 
salary plus bonus alone we will use this measure of compensation in the decomposition below. 
 
(Insert Table 4 Here) 
 
Using the sample 2001-2007 and the above firm specific factors, we estimate two 
random effects models with industry dummy variables in one and industry plus time dummy 
                                                 
4 The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) information technology, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) 
others, 7) materials. 
   11 
variables in the other
5. The results are reported in Table 5. The results for the random effects 
Model 1 with industry factors is very similar to the results for pooled data in Table 3 except 
that the dummy for industry 6 is not significant. Thus, competitive conditions in particular 
industries do not seem to influence compensation much. 
The time dummy variables are highly significant in the second column of Table 5. The 
coefficients  increase  each  year  from  2001 -2007.  The  time  pattern  could  be  caused  by 
macroeconomic influences and provide motivation to analyze the role of these influences. 
 
(Insert Table 5 Here) 
 
Are the patterns for  salary and bonus different? It can be expected that the bonus 
component of compensation is more sensitive than the salary component to performance -
variation over time and across firms. Therefore the model with industry dummies is also 
tested for Salary and Bonus separately. The results are shown in Table 6. There are fewer 
observations for Salary and Bonus separately than for the sum of these components, because 
all observations of zero Bonus are excluded. The Salary component is explained mainly by 
sales, while Tobin’s Q has a strong effect on Bonus but little effect on Salary. Clearly and not 
surprisingly, compensation in the form of bonus is much more sensitive to performance from 
a shareholder perspective than salary compensation. The table also shows that the results for 
Salary plus Bonus are similar to the results for Bonus alone, although the coefficients for the 
total are generally smaller. Since the results are so similar, and since we have twice as many 
observations for total compensation as for Bonus alone, we focus on total compensation in the 
following analysis of macro-factors. 
 
(Insert Table 6 Here) 
 
4.  CEO-compensation and macroeconomic factors 
In this section we turn to an analysis of the macroeconomic influences on CEO-compensation. 
These influences can occur through the performance variables in equation (1) or through other 
variables influencing compensation. We investigate whether macroeconomic variables affect 
compensation independently of variation in Q and Sales, and we analyze macroeconomic 
                                                 
5 The random effects model is compared to pooled linear regressions and the fixed effect model in the next 
section where macro variables are introduced. See footnote 7 below.   12 
influences on Q and Sales. The total macroeconomic influence on compensation is the sum of 
these effects. 
Macroeconomic conditions can be identified using either quantity variables like GDP, 
GDP  growth,  investments  and  employment,  or  using  price  variables  like  interest  rates, 
inflation  and  exchange  rates.  Although  the  former  group  of  variables  describes 
macroeconomic conditions, they are typically observed with a substantial lag. Price variables, 
on the other hand, can be seen as easily observable signals of underlying macroeconomic 
shocks and developments. A shock would have a certain effect on a group of price variables 
as well as on GDP, employment, etc. but only the former would be observable at the time a 
shock occurs. Therefore, these signals can be useful tools for a firm wishing to decompose 
compensation and performance into “intrinsic factors” and macroeconomic factors. Another 
advantage of using price variables like interest rates and exchange rates in the decomposition 
is  that  they  adjust  rapidly  to  both  domestic  and  foreign  conditions  affecting  a  firm’s 
performance.  For  these  reason  we  prefer  to  use  only  price  variables  as  proxies  for 
macroeconomic conditions  in  the following.
6 Specifically, we use exchange rates, interest 
rates, inflation and the market return in the stock market. 
It is likely that each firm’s performance is sensitive to its specific set of variables but 
here we employ one set to explain changes in compensation across firms and time. Thus, we 
obtain  estimates  for  the  macroeconomic  impact  on  compensation  for  the  average  firm. 
Dummy variables for firm characteristics could have been introduced in the analysis if the 
data set had covered a longer time period. We restrict the use of dummies to identification of 
industry effects on levels of compensation. In addition, we use a dummy to identify relatively 
export dependent firms.  
The  first  step  in  the  analysis  of  macroeconomic  influences  on  compensation  is  to 
determine effects of macroeconomic influences controlling for variation in the performance 
variables Q and Sales. The latter variables will explain only a part of changes in compensation 
if corporate boards use varying criteria to determine compensation. The following random 
effects model is estimated: 
 
                                                 
6 An alternative formulation including GDP as well as price variables was tested. The explanatory value of this 
formulation including GDP was much lower than the present formulation. This result supports the idea that price 
variables serve as useful signals of macroeconomic conditions.   13 
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  All variables are defined in log levels. The macro variables are the Swedish one year 
interest rate, the exchange rate (SEK/USD) and the Swedish consumer price index (CPI). The 
stock market index has been removed from the equation. It does not add explanatory value to 
the interest rate. Table 7 shows that the correlation between the market index and the interest 
rate is 0.88.  
 
(Insert Table 7 Here) 
 
Since  compensation  may  be  affected  to  different  degrees  by  anticipated  and 
unanticipated  levels  and  changes  in  the  macro-variables,  we  distinguish  between  the 
anticipated levels of the interest rate and the exchange rate, and the unanticipated changes in 
these variables from the previous year.  
The anticipated exchange rate level in period t is further divided into the level last 
period and the anticipated change from last year. Thereby, the exchange rate can influence 
compensation in three ways; the level from the previous period, the anticipated change from 
previous period and the unanticipated change.  
We assume that compensation is potentially influenced by inflation rather than the 
price level. Since Sales are in nominal values the price level is accounted for in this variable. 
Inflation is also divided into an anticipated and an unanticipated component.  
  Before discussing the results in Table 8 it is important to clarify how anticipated and 
unanticipated changes in the macro variables have been constructed. The following time line 
illustrates the average yearly observations of interest rates, exchange rates, and consumer 
prices. On the time line period t is 2002.    14 
 
   
The expected interest rate in the next period is equal to the current interest rate. Thus, all 
interest rate changes from year to year are assumed to be unanticipated.  
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The return on the 1-year Government bond is used as the interest rate. The expected exchange 
rate change over the next year is reflected in the current one-year interest rate differential 
(uncovered interest rate parity). Thus, 
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The exchange rate is SEK/US Dollars. All the changes are in percent. The expected inflation 
over the next year is equal to the inflation last year. Thus, 
 
2 1      t t t cpi cpi inflation d Anticipate  
    2 1 1         t t t t t cpi cpi cpi cpi inflation ted Unanticipa  
 
Estimating equation 2a we find that the unanticipated interest rate and the anticipated 
inflation rate, as specified above, are insignificant and, therefore, dropped. The following 
specification is estimated. The result is presented in Table 8, Model 1.  
 
     Year 2001 
           t-1 
     Year 2002 
           t 
     Year 2003 
           t+1 
     Year 2000 
           t-2   15 
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  The correlation between the anticipated and the unanticipated exchange rate changes 
is -0.74 as shown in Table 7 and the estimated effect of the former is very small in Model 1. 
For this reason we include the total exchange rate change in Model 2 in Table 8 and the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
(Insert Table 8 Here) 
 
Sales and Tobin’s Q are significant in all the models in Table 8 and their coefficients 
are insensitive to the specification.
7 In comparison with Tables 3 and 4 the coefficient for 
Tobin’s Q, in particular, is substantially smaller as a result of correlation between this variable 
and macroeconomic factors. Thus, it seems that macroeconomic influences occur through Q 
and Sales, as well as through other channels. CEO compensation changes by about 2.30% for 
each  10%  change  in  firm  size,  and  it  changes  about  1%  for  each  10%  change  in  firm 
performance as measured by Q. The former finding is consistent with some findings from the 
US markets. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) find in a US sample for the period 1993-2003 that 
a 10% change in the firm size results in a 2.14% change in CEO compensation. They also find 
                                                 
7 The robustness of the random effects model, Model 4, is further tested by using two alternative specifications, 
i.e. pooled linear regression model or fixed effects model. The random effects exist based on the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test (
2  (1) =1049.11, Prob >
2   = 0.000). Furthermore, based on the Hausman test 
(
2  (5) =11.57, Prob >
2   = 0.024), the random effects model is rejected at 5% level of significance, but it 
cannot be rejected at 1% level of significance. In addition, in order to detect multicollinearity among all the 
factors, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are estimated by using the pooled regression. The average VIF is 
2.67, and the individual VIF is within the range 1.36-4.74. Therefore, multicolinearity does not seem to be a 
problem in the final model.   16 
that a 10% change in performance leads to a 2.11% change in compensation. Our results 
before controlling for macroeconomic factors in Table 4 are consistent with these figures, but 
when we control for macroeconomic factors the compensation effect of a change in Tobin’s Q 
in Table 8 is less than a third of the effect in Table 5.
8 This result indicates that Q also 
depends on macroeconomic factors. We return to this issue. 
The anticipated (lagged) interest rate is strongly significant, negative and almost the 
same in the four specifications. A one percentage point increase in the int erest rate leads to a 
five percent decline in compensation. Since we control for inflation the interest rate can be 
considered real. 
The lagged level of the exchange rate is significant in the four models with a negative 
coefficient indicating that a weaker SEK is associated with a decline in compensation.  The 
unanticipated exchange rate change during the last year has an even stronger negative effect. 
The coefficients for the total exchange rate change in Models 2-4 are almost the same. A one 
percent depreciation of the SEK leads to a 0.7 percent decline in compensation. The negative 
coefficient may seem surprising but it must be remembered that the coefficients include not 
only the direct effects of the macro -economic price variables but the also the effec ts of 
underlying shocks causing the changes in the exchange rate and the other macro variables. For 
example, a depreciating exchange rate is often the result of a weak macro economy with 
negative effects on performance and compensation.  
In Model 3 the interaction between the exchange rate change and the export dummy is 
insignificant. Therefore only the export dummy is kept in the final Model 4.
9 
We turn now to the impact of macroeconomic factors on the performance measures, 
Sales and Q, which systematically affect compensation. We regress these two performance 
variables on the set of macroeconomic and dummy variables used in Model 4 in Table 8. In 
addition, Log (Tobin’s Q) is an independent variable in the regression for log Sales and vice 
versa.  
  Table  9  shows  that  Sales  has  a  small  but  significant  negative  effect  on  Q  when 
controlling for macroeconomic factors. This result indicates that sales generally are higher 
than what value maximization would call for. As expected Tobin’s Q does not affect Sales. 
                                                 
8 Test for simultaneity between performance and compensation (not presented here) indicates that the results are 
not seriously affected by simultaneity. 
9 The compensation for the CEOs in the exp ort firms is about 20% (which is (e
0.18-1)*100) higher than in the 
non-export firms. 
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The only macroeconomic variable that significantly explains Tobin’s Q and Sales is 
the lagged level of the exchange rate. A depreciation of the SEK leads to a decline in both 
variables. None of the other macroeconomic variables has a significant effect on Tobin’s Q 
but  effects  on  Sales  cannot  be  ruled  out  although  the  coefficients  are  not  significant  on 
conventional levels. An exchange rate depreciation has a positive effect on Sales while in 
Table 8 a depreciation affected compensation negatively. The export dummy variable is also 
positive and significant indicating that the sales from export oriented firms are larger than 
sales from other firms.  
 
(Insert Table 9 Here) 
 
In the next section the above estimates of macroeconomic influences on Sales, Q-
values, and on compensation at constant levels of Sales and Q will be used to decompose 
compensation into one component explained by macroeconomic factors and one component 
explained by “intrinsic” factors.  
 
5.  Filtering out macroeconomic influences on compensation 
How would compensation have developed if the impact on compensation of macro-economic 
factors would have been filtered out? Table 10a shows the impact on compensation of the 
total change in the macro variables for the period 2001-2007, while Table 10b displays the 
impact of unanticipated changes in macro variables.  
In each of the tables 10a and10b column (1) shows the percent of salary plus bonus 
caused by macroeconomic variables each year at constant levels of Q and Sales. In 10a the 
column  shows  the  effects  of  total  changes  in  macroeconomic  variables  while  in  10b  the 
effects  of unanticipated changes  are presented. Columns  (2) and (3) show the percent  of 
changes in Q and Sales explained by the same variables. Column (4) presents the sum of the 
effects in columns (1)-(3) using the coefficients in Table 8 Model 4 as weights. Thus, column 
(4) shows the percent change in salary plus bonus each year explained by macroeconomic. In 
columns (5) and (6) we show the macroeconomic effects as percent of bonus payments only.  
Macroeconomic effects are calculated based on deviations from mean levels of the 
macro variables during the period times the coefficients in Table 8, Model 5. The procedure 
for calculating macroeconomic effects on Q and Sales is the same, but the coefficients are 
obtained from Table 9. The mean levels of unanticipated changes are zero. The effects of 
changes in the exchange rate do not include effects of changes in the lagged level of the   18 
exchange rate. 
Column (4) in Table 10a reveals that the macroeconomic factors through all three 
channels  had  a  large  negative  effect  on  compensation  in  2001  (-11.3  percent).  The 
macroeconomic factors had an increasingly positive effect on compensation each year through 
2006  when  macroeconomic  factors  added  nearly  12  percent  to  compensation.  In  2007 
macroeconomic  factors  added  11  percent  to  compensation.  The  average  share  of 
compensation explained by macroeconomic factors is around three and a half percent. This 
small average effect is the result of our assumption that macroeconomic effects occur when 
the variables deviate from their mean values.  
Another way to look at these figures is to calculate how compensation would have 
changed in a stable and average macroeconomic environment. Applying the results in Table 
10a on the index figures for salary plus bonus in Table 1, the compensation adjusted for 
macroeconomic factors in 2001 would have been higher at index 113 (100/(1-0.113) while the 
compensation in 2006 would have been lower at index 135 (151/1.118). In 2007 the adjusted 
compensation  would  have  been  at  index  143  (158/1.108).  In  other  words,  in  a  stable 
macroeconomic environment the compensation would have increased by 19 percent (from 
index 113 to index 135) through 2006 and then increased in 2007 to a level 27 percent above 
2001. Instead we have observed a 58 percent increase in compensation. 
The total macro effects in column (4) are dominated by the independent effects in 
column (1) although the macro effects on both Q and Sales are substantial.  
The total macroeconomic effects each year as percent of bonus payments only are 
presented in columns (6). Since bonus is only a fraction of total compensation, increasing 
from 21 percent to 45 percent of salary plus bonus, the macroeconomic effects here are much 
larger. Table 10a shows that in 2007 macroeconomic factors contributed to compensation an 
amount equal to 33 percent of the bonus payments. 
 
(Insert Table 10a, 10b Here) 
 
The contributions of unanticipated macroeconomic effects are shown in Table 10b for 
the  period  2001-2007.  The  unanticipated  changes  in  macro  variables  include  effects  of 
exchange rate changes and inflation under the assumption that all exchange rate changes are 
unanticipated.   
The contribution of unanticipated macroeconomic factors to compensation is smaller 
than the total effects in the previous table. The time pattern is also very different. Table 10b   19 
Column  (4)  shows  that  the  largest  positive  impact  of  unanticipated  macro  factors  on 
compensation occurred in 2003 (+10.8 percent). The lowest effect occurred in the year 2001 
(-3.5 percent). Clearly, it would make a substantial difference whether compensation levels 
would be adjusted for total macroeconomic influences or only unanticipated influences. 
The unanticipated macroeconomic effects on compensation are quite large relative to 
bonus  payments  some  years  as  shown  in  column  (6).  In  2003  the  compensation  due  to 
unanticipated macroeconomic effects amounted to 63 percent of the bonus payments.  
 
6.  Asymmetric macroeconomic effects  
Since the macroeconomic effects could be asymmetric, Model 4 in Table 8 is re-estimated by 
including interaction terms capturing up or down periods. We define one dummy variable for 
each of the independent variables. Thereby, we analyze whether different sources of changes 
in performance have different asymmetric effects on compensation. In this case there is a Q 
dummy, a Sales dummy, an anticipated interest rate dummy, an exchange rate change dummy 
and an unanticipated inflation dummy.
10 The dummy for the particular variab le takes the 
value one when the variable is increasing relative to the previous year. The sample period is 
2002-2007 since the year 2001 is lost in the creation of dummies for change. Table 11 shows 
the estimated parameters after dropping the change in the exchange rate. This variable and its 
interaction term turn out to be far from significant when asymmetries are introduced. The 
remaining macro factors with asymmetry dummies in Table 11 are the anticipated interest rate 
and unanticipated inflation. 
 
(Insert Table 11 Here) 
 
The F-test for joint significance of the interaction terms for the exchange rate, unanticipated 
inflation plus Q and sales is 
2  = 8.22 (p-value 0.0839). Thus the symmetric model is rejected 
at the 10% significant level. In Table 11 the interactive terms with asymmetry dummies for 
Sales and Q turn out to be significant and positive. The coefficients without interaction terms 
in Table 11 show the effects of falling values of the variables. The effect of a rising value for 
                                                 
10 An alternative way to test for asymmetry is to use the same dummy for all the variables. In this case the 
interactive 0/1 dummy for all variables is set to one in years when the performance variable Q increases. Using 
this approach the interaction terms were not significant and the test for asymmetry effects of all variables on 
compensation did not reveal significant asymmetry. The result of this test is not shown.  
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each  variable  is  obtained  as  the  sum  of  the  two  coefficients  for  the  variable.  Thus,  the 
coefficient for a decline in Sales is 0.211 while the coefficient for an increase is 0.215 (0.211 + 
0.004).  In  spite  of  the  significant  coefficient  this  asymmetry  seems  to  be  negligible.  The 
corresponding coefficients for Q are 0.049 and 1.04 (0.049 + 0.055) Thus, an increase in Q 
increases compensation twice as much as a decrease reduces compensation.  
  Turning to the asymmetric effects of the macroeconomic variables in addition to effects 
through Q and Sales, we can observe that the coefficient for the interactive asymmetry dummy 
for the interest rate is insignificant and negligible. The coefficient for a decline in inflation is 
4.4 while the coefficient for an increase in inflation is as large as 15.8 although the large 
coefficient (11.5) for the interactive term is  not  significant.
11 We conclude that significant 
asymmetric effects of macroeconomic variables occur primarily through effects on Tobin’s Q. 
  Fluctuations in Q depend primarily on fluctuations in the firms share price which in 
turn  depends  on  macroeconomic  factors.  The  asymmetry  of  changes  in  compensation  to 
changes in Q can be explained by bonus payments being linked to firms’ share prices. As noted 
in Tables 9 and 10 changes in bonus payments depend strongly on macroeconomic factors. 
  Another implication of the asymmetry result is that CEOs’ incentives to manage firms’ 
macroeconomic  exposure  is  weakened  by  the  likelihood  that  improved  macroeconomic 
conditions  lead  to  larger  bonus  payments  while  the  “penalty”  for  worse  macroeconomic 
conditions is relatively small. 
 
7.  Conclusions  
The  “optimal”  CEO  compensation  contract  in  terms  of  sensitivity  and  asymmetry  to 
macroeconomic factors from shareholders point of view depends on a number of firm-specific 
factors in addition to ability to forecast macroeconomic developments and risk-aversion of 
managers. Firms differ with respect to adjustability of structure, capacity and operations, and 
they  differ  in  terms  of  their  sensitivity  to  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Thus,  although 
macroeconomic fluctuations are beyond management’s control their impact on performance 
may not be the result of luck alone. If management cannot do much to benefit from positive 
macroeconomic developments or to dampen the effects of negative developments contract 
theory suggest that management should not be rewarded (penalized) for performance it cannot 
                                                 
11 The F-test for joint significance of the interaction terms for the anticipated interest rate and unanticipated 
inflation is 
2  = 0.095 with the p-value=0.6213.   21 
influence. This argument presumes that it does not lie in the shareholders interest to induce 
management to reduce exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations.  
  No  matter  how  the  optimal  incentive  contract  looks  there  is  little  doubt  that 
macroeconomic fluctuations have a powerful impact on CEOs’ compensation in Sweden on 
the average in spite of the fact that the variable part of compensation is lower than elsewhere 
(Fernandes et al., 2008).  
Analysis of the dependence of a particular firm’s performance and CEO-compensation 
on  macroeconomic  conditions  requires  data  for  performance,  compensation,  and  relevant 
macroeconomic data for a substantial period. Lacking such data we were restricted to analyze 
macroeconomic influences on CEO compensation in 127 Swedish firms for the period 2001-
2007  using  the  same  set  of  macroeconomic  factors  for  all  firms.  Using  pooled  data  we 
identified the average impact  of macroeconomic factors on Swedish  firms.  Industry level 
analysis is also constrained by an insufficient number of firms within each industry. 
One set  of macroeconomic variables was  used in  the decomposition  for all firms. 
Thereby,  the  macroeconomic  influences  on  performance  in  many  firms  could  be 
underestimated, since the appropriate set of variables is likely to be firm-specific. 
  Three  channels  of  macroeconomic  influences  on  compensation  were  identified. 
Macroeconomic factors affect sales and Q-values, and they affect compensation through other 
variables  that  affect  compensation  in  a  less  systematic  way  than  sales  and  Q.  The 
macroeconomic  factors  we  identified  as  important  for  the  aggregate  performance  and 
compensation in the Swedish firms were the exchange rate, the interest rate and the inflation 
rate.  These  macroeconomic  price  variables  can  be  viewed  as  signals  of  underlying 
macroeconomic  shocks.  As  such,  they  are  easily  observable  and  useful  for  decomposing 
performance  and  compensation  into  an  “intrinsic”  component  and  a  macroeconomic 
component. 
  After estimation of the sensitivities of performance variables and compensation to the 
macroeconomic  factors  we  used  the  coefficients  in  combination  with  macroeconomic 
developments  each  year  to  calculate  how  compensation  would  have  developed  had 
macroeconomic  influences  been  filtered  out  each  of  the  years  2001  through  2007.  The 
calculations showed that in a neutral and stable macroeconomic environment compensation 
would  have  increased  by  27  percent  rather  than  by  the  observed  58  percent.  Thus,  if 
compensation  had  been  based  on  intrinsic  factors  alone  CEO  compensation  would  have 
increased by less than half of the actual increase.   22 
Unanticipated macroeconomic factors explain a smaller part of compensation. In 2003 
and 2007 these factors increased compensation by 11 and 8 percent while in 2005 the same 
factors reduced compensation by almost 2 percent. As percent of bonus payments the largest 
effect of unanticipated factors amounting to 55 percent occurred in 2002  
The analysis of asymmetric effects on compensation of positive and negative changes 
in performance and macroeconomic variables indicated that the effect of an increase in Q is 
twice as large as the effect of a decrease in Q. This result supports the findings of Garvey and 
Milbourn (2006) and may explain the mechanism behind their findings. Asymmetric effects 
of  macroeconomic  variables  appear  to  take  place  primarily  through  changes  in  Q.  The 
asymmetric effects of increases and decreases in sales appear to be small.  
The main recommendation of this chapter for corporate remuneration policy and for 
regulators is to capture the “sustainable” performance worth a reward by filtering out the 
impact of macroeconomic factors in accordance with the approach developed above and not 
by waiting 3-5 years as suggested by policy-makers to see if the improved performance is still 
observable.  In the latter case luck in one way or the other will still be present.   23 
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Table 1  Compensation Levels: Salary and Bonus 
 
This table displays mean, standard deviation for compensation levels (salary and bonus) (Million 
SEK), as well as the growth index for the CEOs in 127 Swedish firms during the period 2001-2007.  
 














   Panel A: Salary   
Mean  -  3.263  3.579  3.582  3.764  3.975  4.270 
Std.  -  2.462  3.112  2.683  2.812  3.051  3.290 
Index  -  100  110  110  115  121  130 
   Panel B: Bonus 
Mean  -  0.684  0.822  1.306  1.774  1.944  1.932 
Std.  -  1.553  1.672  2.205  2.868  2.941  3.128 
Index  -  100  120  191  259  284  283 
   Panel C: Salary + Bonus  
Mean  3.918  3.948  4.327  4.804  5.450  5.918  6.202 
Std.  4.059  3.658  4.082  4.318  4.934  5.388  5.586 
Index  100  101  111  123  139  151  158   27 
Table 2  Compensation Levels: Salary, Bonus, Options, and Pensions 
 
This table displays mean, standard deviation for compensation levels (salary, bonus, options, and 
pensions) (Million SEK), as well as the growth index for the CEOs in 127 Swedish firms during 
the period 2004-2007.  
 








   Panel A: Salary 
Mean  3.582  3.764  3.975  4.270 
Std.  2.683  2.812  3.051  3.290 
Index  100  105  111  119 
   Panel B: Bonus 
Mean  1.306  1.774  1.944  1.932 
Std.  2.205  2.868  2.941  3.128 
Index  100  136  149  148 
   Panel C: Options 
Mean  0.094  0.432  0.272  0.782 
Std.  0.456  3.036  0.882  3.292 
Index  100  462  290  825 
   Panel D: Pensions 
Mean  1.707  2.020  1.780  1.861 
Std.  2.368  2.921  3.053  2.617 
Index  100  118  104  109 
   Panel E: Salary + Bonus 
Mean  4.804  5.450  5.919  6.202 
Std.  4.318  4.934  5.388  5.586 
Index  100  113  123  129 
   Panel F: Salary + Bonus + Options 
Mean  4.952  5.922  5.821  6.710 
Std.  4.313  6.853  5.119  7.177 
Index  100  120  118  136 
   Panel G: Salary + Bonus + Options + Pensions 
Mean  6.646  7.380  7.672  8.655 
Std.  6.023  6.452  7.160  8.661 
Index  100  111  115  130 
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Table 3  Pooled and Cross-Sectional Regressions without Macro Variables 
 
This  table  reports  the  parameter  estimations  from  both  pooled  and  cross-sectional  regressions  from  equation  (1).  The  dependent  variable  is  Log 
(Compensation). The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) information technology, 3) financials, 4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) others, and 7) materials. 
The dummy 7 is dropped in the model.  
 
















Log (Sales)  0.277***  0.293***  0.266***  0.235***  0.290***  0.300***  0.275***  0.285*** 
  (29.21)  (12.43)  (11.92)  (9.74)  (11.88)  (11.66)  (9.67)  (9.78) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.236***  0.094  0.070  0.205***  0.286***  0.309***  0.277***  0.202*** 
  (7.28)  (1.17)  (0.84)  (1.98)  (2.91)  (3.29)  (2.91)  (2.20) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.051  0.210  0.049  0.083  0.040  0.032  -0.036  0.094 
  (0.54)  (0.86)  (0.229  (0.32)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (-0.13)  (0.33) 
Industry Dummy 2  0.053  0.324  0.053  -0.047  0.060  0.072  -0.058  0.064 
  (0.59)  (1.41)  (0.26)  (-0.19)  (0.26)  (0.30)  (-0.23)  (0.25) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.174***  0.318  0.058  0.239  0.347  0.298  -0.052  -0.016 
  (2.01)  (1.44)  (0.28)  (1.03)  (1.61)  (1.32)  (-0.20)  (-0.06) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.564***  0.762***  0.552***  0.559  0.437  0.587***  0.641**  0.673*** 
  (4.98)  (2.65)  (2.10)  (1.78)*  (1.53)  (1.99)  (1.91)  (2.03) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.125  0.265  0.091  0.090  0.094  0.035  0.156  0.229 
  (1.52)  (1.26)  (0.48)  (0.41)  (0.45)  (0.16)  (0.65)  (0.94) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.425***  0.425  0.324  0.342  0.312  0.482  0.544  0.554 
  (3.02)  (1.21)  (0.98)  (0.90)  (0.88)  (1.30)  (1.33)  (1.35) 
Constant  10.743***  10.221***  10.910***  11.372***  10.514***  10.425***  10.887***  10.787*** 
  (63.41)  (24.26)  (27.74)  (26.33)  (24.23)  (22.62)  (21.29)  (20.74) 
Observations  846  122  127  127  127  127  111  109 
Adjusted R
2  55%  60%  58%  48%  56%  54%  52%  53% 
1. t-values are in round parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.   29 
Table 4  Pooled Regression using Salary plus Bonus, or Salary plus Bonus plus Options, or 
Salary plus Bonus plus Options plus Pensions as Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from three pooled models to identify compensations. The 
dependent variable is Log (Salary + Bonus), Log (Salary + Bonus + Options), or Log (Salary + Bonus 
+ Options + Pensions). The industries are: 1) consumer goods, 2) information technology, 3) financials, 
4) health care, 5) industrials, 6) others, and 7) materials. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped in 
the models. The time period is 2004-2007.  
 
  Log  
(Salary + Bonus) 
Log  
(Salary + Bonus + 
Options) 
Log  
(Salary + Bonus + 
Options + Pensions) 
Log (Sales)  0.279***  0.287***  0.309*** 
  (21.63)  (21.34)  (23.43) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.246***  0.270***  0.275*** 
  (5.70)  (5.99)  (6.22) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.001  0.011  -0.030 
  (0.01)  (0.08)  (-0.24) 
Industry Dummy 2  0.057  0.060  -0.037 
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (-0.32) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.125  0.163  0.033 
  (1.11)  (1.39)  (0.29) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.629***  0.632***  0.530*** 
  (3.94)  (3.81)  (3.25) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.127  0.138  0.027 
  (1.20)  (1.25)  (0.25) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.451***  0.468***  0.348** 
  (2.53)  (2.52)  (1.91) 
Constant  10.802***  10.682***  10.709*** 
  (47.16)  (44.74)  (45.72) 
Observations  438  438  438 
Adjusted R
2  57%  56%  61% 
1. t-values are in round parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.  30 
Table 5  Random Effects Model with Industry or Industry and Time Dummy Variables 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from two random effects models for the period 2001-2007. 
The dependent variable is Log (Compensation). In the first model the industry dummies are used, 
while in the second model both industry and time dummies are used. The industries are: 1) consumer 
goods,  2)  information  technology,  3)  financials,  4)  health  care,  5)  industrials,  6)  others,  and  7) 
materials. The time dummies are the years 2001-2007. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped in 
the first model, while the industry dummy variable 7 and time dummy variable for the year 2001 are 
dropped in the second model.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Log (Sales)  0.260***  0.233*** 
  (15.28)  (13.34) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.189***  0.083*** 
  (6.19)  (2.55) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.121  0.120 
  (0.62)  (0.61) 
Industry Dummy 2  -0.006  0.002 
  (-0.03)  (0.01) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.185  0.186 
  (1.03)  (1.02) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.524***  0.556** 
  (2.21)  (2.30) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.125  0.141 
  (0.71)  (0.79) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.406  0.374 
  (1.31)  (1.18) 
Year Dummy 2002  -  0.082*** 
    (2.06) 
Year Dummy 2003  -  0.172*** 
    (4.44) 
Year Dummy 2004  -  0.219*** 
    (5.63) 
Year Dummy 2005  -  0.300*** 
    (7.64) 
Year Dummy 2006  -  0.319*** 
    (7.73) 
Year Dummy 2007    0.360*** 
    (8.87) 
Constant  11.027***  11.270*** 
  (33.98)  (34.66) 
Observations  846  846 




1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.  31 
Table 6  Random  Effects  Model  using  Salary,  Bonus  or  Salary  plus  Bonus  as  Dependent 
Variable 
 
This  table  reports  the  parameter  estimations  from  three  random  effects  models.  The  dependent 
variable is Log (Salary), Log (Bonus), or Log (Salary plus Bonus). The industries are: 1) consumer 
goods,  2)  information  technology,  3)  financials,  4)  health  care,  5)  industrials,  6)  others,  and  7) 
materials. The industry dummy variable 7 is dropped in the models. The time period is 2002-2005. 
The regressions are based on the sample that firm pays bonus for the year.  
 





(Salary plus Bonus) 
Log (Sales)  0.239***  0.352***  0.286*** 
  (4.81)  (8.84)  (15.06) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.005  0.623***  0.162*** 
  (0.14)  (6.31)  (4.40) 
Industry Dummy 1  0.185  0.031  0.168 
  (1.14)  (0.08)  (0.88) 
Industry Dummy 2  0.115  0.322  0.242 
  (0.74)  (0.88)  (1.32) 
Industry Dummy 3  0.175  1.185***  0.492*** 
  (1.13)  (3.22)  (2.65) 
Industry Dummy 4  0.690***  1.094***  0.890*** 
  (3.28)  (2.21)  (3.54) 
Industry Dummy 5  0.093  0.386  0.190 
  (0.64)  (1.13)  (1.10) 
Industry Dummy 6  0.429*  0.706  0.529** 
  (1.78)  (1.24)  (1.84) 
Constant  11.245  7.651***  10.670*** 
  (38.76)  (10.77)  (31.20) 
Observations  456  456  456 






1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.   32 
Table 7   Correlations 
 






























Log (Salary and Bonus)  1                   
Log (Sales)  0.7046  1                 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.0629  -0.1845  1               
Log (1+Market return)  0.1782  0.0425  0.2106  1             
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -0.1791  -0.0524  -0.2031  -0.8878  1           
Log (1+Unanti. interest rate)  0.1057  0.0489  0.0248  0.2539  -0.5223  1         
Log (1+Anti. Δexchange rate)  -0.0517  -0.0421  -0.0572  0.0361  0.2512  -0.7383  1       
Log (1+Unanti. Δexchange rate)  -0.0137  0.0252  0.0561  -0.1854  -0.1024  0.2449  -0.7339  1     
Log (1+Anti. ΔCPI)  -0.1056  -0.0429  -0.2071  -0.4207  0.6399  -0.2803  0.5952  -0.6984  1   
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  0.0091  0.0222  0.0331  -0.2990  0.0176  0.4451  -0.8655  0.6674  -0.5689  1 
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Table 8  Random Effects Model with Firm Specific Factors and Interest Rate, Exchange 
Rate and Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
 
This  table  reports  the  parameter  estimations  from  four  random  effects  models.  The  dependent 
variable is Log (Compensation). The industry dummy variables are included in all the models but not 
reported her. The time period is 2001-2007. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Log (Sales)  0.234***  0.234***  0.226***  0.226*** 
  (13.43)  (13.42)  (12.67)  (12.68) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.072***  0.075***  0.075***  0.075*** 
  (2.27)  (2.37)  (2.37)  (2.37) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -5.495**  -5.222**  -5.295**  -5.293** 
  (-2.19)  (-2.14)  (-2.18)  (-2.17) 
Log (1+Anti. Δexchange rate)  -0.009  -  -  - 
  (-0.01)  -  -  - 
Log (1+UnAnti. Δexchange rate)  -0.681***  -  -  - 
  (-4.51)       
Log (1+Δexchange rate)  -  -0.703***  -0.660***  -0.703*** 
    (-4.89)  (-3.57)  (-4.89) 
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  3.482  2.483**  2.508**  2.507** 
  (1.34)  (1.76)  (1.77)  (1.77) 
Log (Exchange rate (t-1))  -0.547***  -0.540***  -0.542***  -0.542 
  (-3.18)  (-3.15)  (-3.17)  (-3.17) 
Export Dummy  -  -  0.179**  0.182** 
      (1.91)  (1.95) 
Export Dummy         
   Log (1+Δexchange rate)  -  -  -0.821   
      (-0.36)   
Constant  12.776***  12.757***  12.737***  12.735** 
  (27.77)  (27.83)  (27.97)  (27.97) 
Observations  846  846  846  846 








1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better.   34 
Table 9  Random Effects Model with Tobin’s Q or Sales as Depended Variable and Interest 
Rate, Exchange Rate and Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from two random effects models. The industry dummy 
variables are included in both models but not reported her. The time period is 2002-2007. 
 
  Q Equation  Sales Equation 
Log (Sales)  -0.031*  - 
  -(1.70)   
Log (Tobin’s Q)  -  -0.044 
    (-1.04) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -1.096  -3.725 
  -(0.40)  (-1.20) 
Log (1+Δexchange rate)  0.064  0.204 
  (0.40)  (1.11) 
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  0.405  2.316 
  (0.26)  (1.28) 
Log (Exchange rate (t-1))  -1.063***  -0.624*** 
  -(5.69)  (-2.85) 
Export Dummy  0.036  1.402*** 
  (0.38)  (3.88) 
Constant  2.967***  16.231*** 
  (6.31)  (19.15) 
Observations  846  846 




1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. 
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Table 10a  Contribution of the Anticipated and Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation (Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, and 
Inflation) 
 
This table reports the predicted anticipated and unanticipated macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 2001-2007 using Model 4 in Table 
8, and the models in Table 9. The macroeconomic factors are risk free return, exchange rate, and inflation. In the column (4) and column (6), w1 and w2 are 
the coefficients for the variables Log (Tobin’s Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 8, Model 4.  
 
Year 
Macro Effects in the 
Compensation 
Equation; Salary 
plus Bonus, given Q 
and Sales 
Macro Effects in the 
Q Equation 
Macro Effects in  
the Sales Equation 
Total Macro 
Effects to  
Salary and Bonus 
(1)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
Macro Effects in the 
Compensation 
Equation to the 
Bonus Only 
Total Macro 
Effects to the 
Bonus Only 
(5)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                            2001  -11.61%  0.04%  1.30%  -11.31%  -  - 
2002  1.09%  -1.38%  -4.95%  -0.13%  6.31%  5.09% 
2003  7.26%  -2.40%  -8.35%  5.19%  38.88%  36.81% 
2004  3.96%  -0.96%  -4.70%  2.83%  14.84%  13.70% 
2005  3.11%  1.23%  4.16%  4.15%  9.72%  10.76% 
2006  10.47%  3.78%  4.57%  11.78%  31.87%  33.19% 
2007  9.98%  1.09%  3.46%  10.84%  32.03%  32.90% 
Average  3.47%  0.20%  -0.64%  3.35%  22.28%  22.07% 
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Table 10b    Contribution of the Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation (Exchange Rate, and Inflation) 
 
This table reports the predicted unanticipated macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 2001-2007 using Model 4 in Table 8, and the 
Models in Table 9. The macroeconomic factors are risk free return, exchange rate, and inflation. In the columns (4) and (6), w1 and w2 are the coefficients 




Effects in the 
Compensation 
Equation; Salary 
plus Bonus, given Q 
and Sales 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects in the 
Q Equation 
Unanticipated Macro 
Effects in  
the Sales Equation 
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to the  
Salary and Bonus 
(1)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects in the 
Compensation 




Macro Effects to 
the Bonus Only 
(5)+w1×(2)+w2×(3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                            2001  -4.83%  1.33%  5.56%  -3.48%  -  - 
2002  4.65%  -0.62%  -2.28%  4.09%  26.85%  26.29% 
2003  11.94%  -1.31%  -4.48%  10.83%  63.91%  62.80% 
2004  2.67%  -1.24%  -5.69%  1.29%  9.98%  8.60% 
2005  -1.82%  0.21%  0.74%  -1.64%  -5.70%  -5.51% 
2006  4.15%  2.31%  -0.48%  4.22%  12.64%  12.71% 
2007  7.72%  0.58%  1.77%  8.17%  24.79%  25.24% 
Average  3.50%   0.18%  -0.69%  3.35%  22.08%  21.69% 
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Table 11  Test for the Asymmetric Macroeconomic Effects 
 
This table  reports the  parameter  estimations from  the  random  effects  model testing  for  the 
asymmetric  macroeconomic  effects.  The  dependent  variable  is  Log  (Compensation).  The 
industry dummy variables are included in the model but not reported her. The time period is 
2002-2007. 
 
  Model 
Log (Sales)  0.211*** 
  (8.64) 
Log (Tobin’s Q)  0.049 
  (1.15) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  14.637 
  (0.61) 
Log (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  4.366 
  (1.36) 
Log (Exchange rate (t-1))  -1.158 
  (-1.16) 
Sales DummyLog (Sales)  0.004* 
  (1.82) 
Q DummyLog (Tobin’s Q)  0.055** 
  (1.95) 
Anti. Interest Rate Dummy Log (1+Anti. interest rate)  -0.662 
  (-0.22) 
Unanti. Inflation DummyLog (1+Unanti. ΔCPI)  11.475 
  (0.72) 
Export Dummy  0.216** 
  (1.98) 
Constant  13.625*** 
  (9.69) 
Observations  719 
Wald test  -377.29*** 
[0.000] 
1. t-values are in round parentheses, and p-values are in square parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. 
 
 